

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY
Political Science 231
Spring 2020, Tuesday 9-11:50am, Online Webinar

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Office Hours: Wednesdays 1:30-3:00pm and by appointment on Zoom

Course Description:

This course examines how domestic and international politics influence the economic relations between states. It will address the major theoretical debates in the field and introduce the chief methodological approaches used in contemporary analyses. We will focus attention on four types of cross-border flows and the policies and international institutions that regulate them: the flow of goods (trade policy), the flow of capital (financial and exchange rate policy), the flow and location of production (foreign direct investment policy), and the flow of people (immigration policy).

Requirements:

- All classes will be hosted on Zoom. Download zoom if you haven't yet. All students are required to attend class regularly and to participate in classroom lectures and discussions.
 - *Illness policy: If you are ill or if you are taking care of someone who is ill, you may be excused. Let me know as soon as possible, with the understanding that that might be after class.*
 - Recording sessions: I plan to record the sessions for those who are ill/ cannot make it and posting them on the course website.
- Students are also required to choose three weeks to write short critical reviews. The reviews, limited to five pages, summarize the theoretical and/or empirical results of two or three articles on a specific topic (articles should be from either the required or recommended reading list on the syllabus for a given topic), highlight the contribution, critically evaluate the work (e.g. highlight strengths and weaknesses of the theory or research design), and suggest research that would extend, further evaluate, and/or correct the summarized work. The reviews are to be sent by email to me by **5pm** the day preceding the class meeting on which the topic will be discussed. At the discretion of the instructor, the student may be asked to discuss some of his/her arguments in class.
- Take home final exam. The take home final will be in the format of a field exam, but shorter and only focused on IPE.

The requirements for the course will have the following weights;

Participation: 30%

Critical Reviews: 20%

Final Exam: 50%

Readings and Schedule:

Note about the readings: You will find some readings listed as required and others as recommended. The recommended readings are there to expand on a topic for those who might want to do research/ are where I dump old readings that I've updated with something new. That said, I expect that most students will read at least one additional reading a week.

Suggested Background Materials (For those with limited familiarity with IPE)

- Krugman, Paul and Maurice Obsfelt (and Melitz). *International Economics*. Chapters noted will be from the 10th edition, you can use any edition but some of the earlier editions do not have the chapter on “new” new trade.
- Bansak, Cynthia, Nicole B. Simpson, and Madeline Zavodny. *The Economics of Immigration*

1. History of the Global Economy & Approaches to IPE

In discussion for this week, I want you to come with questions and observations from the Frieden book (which you should buy). What is new to you? (Maybe everything.) What confused you? What did you find most interesting? The goal is to introduce you all to the history of globalization over the last two centuries; some of the major policy debates and issues; and give you some “data” with which to judge the later works.

Second, we will go over the Lake piece about how we do modern IPE.

Required:

- Read all of Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism*
- Lake, David. 2009. “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review.” *The Review of International Organizations* 4(3):219-44.

Recommended:

- Economics texts:
 - Krugman, Obsfelt, & Melitz: Ch. 2-5, 9
 - Bansak et al.: Ch. 7 & 8
 - Kind of nerdy debates on the history of IPE, different approaches, etc.
 - Cohen, B. J. (2008). *International political economy: an intellectual history*. Princeton, New Jersey. **Chapters 2 & 3**
 - Oatley, T. (2011). The reductionist gamble: Open economy politics in the global economy. *International Organization* 65(2), 311–341.
 - Keohane, R. O. (2009). The old IPE and the new. *Review of International Political Economy*, 16(1), 34-46.
 - Seabrooke, L., & Young, K. L. (2017). The networks and niches of international political economy. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(2), 288-331.
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2. The basics of trade and distributional effects

Required:

- Rogowski, Ronald. 1992. *Commerce and Coalitions*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. Chapters 1 and 2
- Alt, James E., & Michael Gilligan. 1994. “The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions.” *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2(2): 165–192.
- Grossman, Gene M., & Elhanan Helpman. 1994. “Protection for Sale.” *American Economic Review* 84(4): 833–850.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. “Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest,

- Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety.” *International Organization* 63 (3):425-57.
- Rho, S. and Tomz, M., 2017. Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest? *International Organization*, 71(S1), pp.85-108.

Recommended:

- Erica Owen, Noel P. Johnston. 2017. “Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment.” *International Organization*
- Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi. 2014. “Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Trade Policy, ILWU Puzzle.” *International Organization*
- Lu, Xiaobo, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter (2012) “Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection” *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3)July, 638-654.
- Hainmueller, Jens, & Michael Hiscox. 2006. “Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade.” *International Organization* 60(2): 469–498.
- Scheve, Kenneth, & Matthew Slaughter. 2001. “What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?” *Journal of International Economics* 54(2): 267–292.
- Alexandra Guisinger. 2017. *American Opinion on Trade*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 6.
- Hathaway, Oona A., “Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection.” *International Organization*
- Milner, H. V. (1988). Trading places: Industries for free trade. *World Politics* 40(3), 350–376.
- Dean, Adam. "The gilded wage: profit-sharing institutions and the political economy of trade." *International Studies Quarterly* 59, no. 2 (2015): 316-329.
- Megumi Naoi and Ellis Krauss. 2009. “Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral System” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol.53, No.4. October 2009.
- Baldwin, Robert E., & Christopher Magee. 2000. “Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills.” *Public Choice* 105(1–2): 79–101.
- Gawande, Kishore, & Bandyopadhyay Usree. 2000. “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman- Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 82(1): 139–152.
- Mitra, Devashish. 1999. “Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination.” *American Economic Review* 89(5): 1116–1134. 3
- Trefler, Daniel. 1993. “Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy.” *Journal of Political Economy* 101(1): 138–160.
- Bailey, Michael. 2001. “Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983–94.” *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26(1): 45–80.
- Ladewig, Jeffrey W. 2006. “Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor Mobility in the United States, 1963 to 1992.” *International Organization* 60(1): 69–103.
- Hiscox. 2001. “Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade.” *International Organization*, 55(1): 1-46.
- Schnietz. 2003. “The Reaction of Private Interests to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.” *International Organization*, 57(Winter): 213-33.

- Douglas Nelson, "Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey," *American Journal of Political Science*, August 1988.
- Mayda, Anna, & Dani Rodrik. 2005. "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?" *European Economic Review* 49(6): 1393–1430.
- Dutt, Pushan, & Devashish Mitra. 2005. "Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(1): 59–72.
- O'Rourke, Kevin H., & Richard Sinnott. 2001. "The Determinants of Individual Trade-Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence." *Brookings Trade Forum* 2001: 157–196.
- Scheve, Kenneth, & Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. *Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
- Tavares, Jos'e. 2008. "Trade, Factor Proportions, and Political Rights." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 90(1): 163–168.
- Verdier, Daniel. 1994 *Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860–1990*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Baker, Andy. 2005. "Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 924–938.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. "Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation." *American Political Science Review* 96(3): 593–608.
- Yotam Margalit. 2011. "Costly Jobs: Trade-related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in U.S. Elections." *American Political Science Review* 105, 166-188.
- Goldberg, Pınelopi K., & Giovanni Maggi. 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 89(5): 1135–1155.
- Hays, Jude S., Sean D. Ehrlich, & Clint Peinhardt. 2005. "Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis." *International Organization* 59(2): 473–494.
- Walter, S., 2010. Globalization and the welfare state: Testing the microfoundations of the compensation hypothesis. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(2), pp.403-426.

3. Trade and the state (the old); New new trade theory (the new)

Required:

- Krasner, Stephen. 1976. "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." *World Politics* 28(3): 317–347.
- Gowa, Joanne, & Edward Mansfield. 1993. "Power Politics and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 87(2): 408–420.
- Melitz, Marc J., and Daniel Trefler. "Gains from trade when firms matter." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26, no. 2 (2012): 91-118.
- Kim, I.S., 2017. Political cleavages within industry: firm-level lobbying for trade liberalization. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1), pp.1-20.
- Iain Osgood, "The Breakdown of Industrial Opposition to Trade: Firms, Product Variety and Reciprocal Liberalization," *World Politics* 69, No. 1 (2017), pages 184–231.

Recommended:

Trade and the state

- Hirschman, Albert. *National Power and the Structure of Trade*. Chapters 1-3.
- Davis, Christina, and Sophie Meunier. Forthcoming. "Business as Usual? Economic Responses to Political Tensions." *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Kindleberger, Charles P. 1975. "The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820–1875." *Journal of Economic History* 35(1): 20–55.
- Gowa, Joanne. 1989. "Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?" *World Politics* 41(3): 307–324.
- Gowa, Joanne. 1989. "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Free Trade." *American Political Science Review* 83(4): 1245–1256.
- Lake, David. 1988. *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Mansfield, Edward. 1994. *Power, Trade, and War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- J. Goldstein and J. Gowa, "Building the GATT/WTO Regime: The Hegemon's Dilemma" *World Trade Review*, 2004.
- Lloyd Gruber, *Ruling the World*, pp. 15-57.
- Keohane, Robert. 1997. "Problematic Lucidity" *World Politics*. October.
- Krasner. 1991. "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier." *World Politics*, 43(3): 336-66.
- Berger, Daniel, William Easterly, Nathan Nunn, & Shanker Satyanath. Forthcoming. "Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade During the Cold War." *American Economic Review*.

New new trade theory

- Kim, In Song, Steven Liao, and Kosuke Imai. "Measuring Trade Profile with Granular Product-Level Data." *American Journal of Political Science* (2020).
- Osgood, Iain, and Margaret Peters. "Escape Through Export? Women-Owned Enterprises, Domestic Discrimination, and Global Markets." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 12, no. 2 (2017): 143-183.
- Osgood, Iain. 2018. "Globalizing the Supply Chain: Firm and Industrial Support for US Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 72 (2):455–484.
- Kim, In Song, Helen Milner, Thomas Bernauer, Iain, Osgood, Gabrielle Spilker, and Dustin Tingley. 2019. "Firms and Global Value Chains: Identifying Firms' Multidimensional Trade Preferences." *International Studies Quarterly* 63(1):153–167.
- Kim, In Song and Iain Osgood. 2019. "Firms in Trade and Trade Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 22:399–417.

4. Institutions, International organizations, and trade

Required:

- Goldstein, Judith. "Ideas, institutions, and American trade policy." *International Organization* 42, no. 1 (1988): 179-217.
- Bailey, Michael, Judith Goldstein, & Barry R. Weingast. 1997. "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade." *World Politics* 49(3): 309–338.
- Milner, Helen and Keiko Kubota. 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and

- Trade in Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 59(1):107-143.
- Rosendorff, B.P. and Milner, H.V., 2001. “The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape.” *International Organization*, 55(4), pp.829-857.
- Davis, Christina. 2004. “International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization.” *American Political Science Review*. 98:1. 153-69.
- Goldstein, J.L., Rivers, D. and Tomz, M., 2007. “Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade.” *International Organization*, 61(1), pp.37-67.

Recommended:

Domestic Institutions

- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, & B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 305–321.
- Daniel Y. Kono, “Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency.” *American Political Science Review* 100, 3 (August 2006):369-384.
- Alt, James E., Jeffrey Frieden, Michael Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, & Ronald Rogowski. 1996. “The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry.” *Comparative Political Studies* 29(6): 689–717.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. “Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions.” *International Organization* 41(2): 203–223.
- Mansfield, Edward D., & Marc L. Busch. 1995. “The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis.” *International Organization* 49(4): 723–749.
- Park, Jong Hee, and Nathan Jensen. 2007. “Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries.” *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2):314-329.
- Menendez, Irene. "Globalization and welfare spending: how geography and electoral institutions condition compensation." *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 4 (2016): 665-676.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. “The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization.” *International Organization* 53(4): 669–698.
- Irwin, Douglas A., & Randall S. Kroszner. 1999. “Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley.” *Journal of Law and Economics* 42(2): 643–673.

International Institutions

- Bagwell, Kyle, & Robert W. Staiger. 1999. “An Economic Theory of GATT.” *American Economic Review* 89(1): 215–248.
- Maggi, Giovanni, & Andres Rodriguez-Clare. 1998. “The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures.” *Journal of Political Economy* 106(3): 574–601.
- Rosendorff, Peter. 2005. “Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Design of the WTO’s Dispute Resolution Procedure.” *American Political Science Review* 99(3):389-400.
- Maggi, Giovanni. 1999. “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation.” *American Economic Review* 89(1): 190–214.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, & B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. “Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements.” *International Organization* 56(3): 477– 513.
- Maggi, Giovanni, & Andres Rodriguez-Clare. 2007. “A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements.” *American Economic Review* 97(4): 1374-1406.
- Staiger, Robert W. 1995. “International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy.” In

- Grossman, Gene M., & Kenneth Rogoff. eds. *Handbook of International Economics*. Vol. 3. New York, NY: Elsevier, pp. 1495–1551.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter, & Helen V. Milner. 2001. “The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape.” *International Organization* 55(4): 829–857.
 - Grossman, Gene M., & Elhanan Helpman. 1995. “Trade Wars and Trade Talks.” *Journal of Political Economy* 103(4): 675–708.
 - Rose, Andrew K. 2004. “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?” *American Economic Review* 94(1): 98–114.
 - Tomz, Michael, Judith L. Goldstein, & Douglas Rivers. 2007. “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment.” *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2005–2018.
 - Rose, Andrew K. 2007. “Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Reply.” *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2019–2025.
 - Marc L. Busch. 2007. “Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade.” *International Organization* 61 (Fall): 735–61.
 - Staiger, Robert W., & Guido Tabellini. 1999. “Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?” *Economics and Politics* 11(2): 109–44.
 - Bagwell, Kyle, & Robert Staiger. 2002. *The Economics of the World Trading System*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
 - Gowa, Joanne, & Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. “An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950–94.” *World Politics* 57(4): 453–478.
 - Limão, Nuno 2006. “Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States.” *American Economic Review* 96(3): 896–914.
 - Limão, Nuno 2007. “Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-Trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for Multilateral Liberalization?” *Review of Economic Studies* 74(3): 821–855.
 - Estevadeordal, Antoni, Caroline Freund, & Emanuel Ornelas. 2008. “Does Regionalism Affect Trade Liberalization Toward Nonmembers?” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123(4): 1531–1575.
 - Jackson, John. 2000. “The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.” *Brookings Trade Forum* 2000: 179–219.
 - Jeffrey Kucik and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. “Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime.” *International Organization* 62 (Summer): 477–505.

5. The movement of production: Foreign Direct Investment

Required:

- Pandya, Sonal. *Trading Spaces: Foreign Direct Investments Regulation 1970-2000*. Ch. 2.
- Simmons, Beth. 2014. “Bargaining over BITs, Arbitrating Awards: The Regime for Protection and Promotion of International Investment.” *World Politics* 66(1):12–46.
- Johns, Leslie, and Rachel L. Wellhausen. “Under one roof: Supply chains and the protection of foreign investment.” *American Political Science Review* 110.1 (2016): 31–51.
- Malesky, Edmund, Dimitar Georguiev, and Nathan Jensen. 2015. “Monopoly Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam, a Survey Experiment.” *American Journal of Political Science* 59(2):419–439.

- Wellhausen, Rachel. 2019. "International Investment Law and Foreign Direct Reinvestment." *International Organization* 73(4):839–58.

Recommended:

- Kerner, Andrew. "Why should I believe you? The costs and consequences of bilateral investment treaties." *International Studies Quarterly* 53.1 (2009): 73-102.
- Allee, Todd, & Clint Peinhardt. 2011. "Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment." *International Organization* 65(3): 401–432.
- Li, Quan, & Adam Resnick. 2003. "Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries." *International Organization* 57(1): 175–211.
- Jensen, Nathan. 2003. "Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment." *International Organization* 57(3): 587–616.
- Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, & Beth A. Simmons. 2006. "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000." *International Organization* 60(4): 811–846.
- Buthe, Tim, and Helen Milner. 2008. "The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4):741–62.
- Doshi, Rush, Judith Kelley, & Beth A. Simmons. 2019. "The Power of Ranking: The Ease of Doing Business Indicator and Global Regulatory Behavior." *International Organization* 73(3): 611–643.
- Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, & Beth A. Simmons. 2006. "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000." *International Organization* 60(4): 811–846.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1994. "International Investment and Colonial Control: A New Interpretation." *International Organization* 48(4):559–593.
- Hanson, Gordon H., Raymond J. Mataloni, Jr. & Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. "Expansion Strategies of U.S. Multinational Firms." *Brookings Trade Forum*: 245–282.
- Helpman, Elhanan. 2006. "Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms." *Journal of Economic Literature* 44(3): 589–630.
- Henisz, Witold J. 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 16(2): 334–364.
- Jandhyala, Srividya, Witold J. Henisz, & Edward D. Mansfield. 2011. "Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign Investment Policy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(6):1047–73.
- Jensen, J. Bradford, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. 2015. "The Influence of Firm Global Supply Chains and Foreign Currency Undervaluations on US Trade Disputes." *International Organization* 69:913-947.
- Jensen, Nathan. 2003. "Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment." *International Organization* 57(3): 587–616.
- Jensen, Nathan, Edmund Malesky, and Stephen Weymouth. 2014. "Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk." *British Journal of Political Science* 44(3):655–684.
- Kobrin, Stephen J. 1987. "Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in Developing Countries." *International Organization* 41(4):609–638.

- Li, Quan, & Adam Resnick. 2003. "Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries." *International Organization* 57(1): 175–211.
- Malesky, Edmund. 2008. "Straight Ahead on Red: How Foreign Direct Investment Empowers Subnational Leaders." *Journal of Politics* 70(1):97-119.
- Mosley, Layna, Brian Greenhill, and Aseem Prakash. 2009. "Trade-Based Diffusion of Labor Rights: A Panel Study, 1986-2002." *American Political Science Review* 103(4):669-690.
- Owen, Erica. 2015. "The Political Power of Organized Labor and the Politics of Foreign Direct Investment in Developed Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies*.
- Pandya, Sonal. 2010. "Labor Markets and Demand for Foreign Direct Investment." *International Organization* 64(3): 389–409.
- Sonal Pandya. 2016. "Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment: Globalized Production in the Twenty-First Century." *Annual Review of Political Science* 19:455–475.
- Pinto, Pablo, and Santiago M. Pinto. 2008. "The Politics of Investment. Partisanship and the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment." *Economics & Politics* 20(2): 216–254.
- Scheve, Kenneth F., & Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. "Economic Insecurity and the Globalization of Production." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 662–674.
- Tobin, Jennifer L. & Marc L. Busch. 2010. "A BIT is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements." *World Politics* 62(1): 1–42.
- Tomz, Michael, & Mark L. J. Wright. 2010. "Sovereign Theft: Theory and Evidence about Sovereign Default and Expropriation." In *The Natural Resources Trap: Private Investment without Public Commitment*, eds. William Hogan and Federico Sturzenegger. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 69–110.
- Pinto, Pablo, and Santiago M. Pinto. 2008. "The Politics of Investment. Partisanship and the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment." *Economics & Politics* 20(2):216–254.
- Jandhyala, Srividya, Witold J. Henisz, and Edward D. Mansfield. 2011. "Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign Investment Policy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 55(6):1047-1073.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan and Tobin, Jennifer. 2009. "Do BITs Benefit Developing Countries?" In *The Future of Investment Arbitration*, R.P. Alford & C. A. Rogers eds.
- Kerner, Andrew and Jane Lawrence. 2012. *What's The Risk? Bilateral Investment Treaties, Political Risk and Fixed Capital Accumulation* *British Journal of Political Science*.

6. Money: Exchange rates

Required:

- Kindleberger, Charles P. 1986. *The World in Depression 1929–1939*. Revised and enlarged edition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Chapter 14.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. *Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy*. Ch. 1 & 3.
- Eichengreen, Barry. 1992. *Golden Fetters*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1.
- Walter, S., 2008. A new approach for determining exchange-rate level preferences. *International Organization*, 62(3), pp.405-438.

- Broz, J. Lawrence. 2002. "Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes." *International Organization* 56 (4):863-889.

Recommended:

- Steinberg, David and Krishan Malhotra. 2014. "The Effect of Authoritarian Regime Type on Exchange Rate Policy." *World Politics* (2014).
- Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffry Frieden, & Stephen Weymouth. 2008. "Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data." *IMF Staff Papers* 55(3): 417-444.
- Keefer, Philip, & David Stasavage. 2003. "The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy." *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 407-423.
- John Goodman and Louis Pauly (1993) The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets *World Politics* 46(1):50-82.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, Jay C. Shambaugh, & Alan M. Taylor. 2005. "The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(3): 423-438.
- Jupille, Joseph and David Leblang. 2007. "Voting for Change: Calculation, Community and Euro Referendums," *International Organization* 61:763-82.
- J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffry Frieden, "The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001):317-343.
- Christopher J. Neely, "An Introduction to Capital Controls," *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review* 81:6 (Nov/Dec 1999):13-30.
- Bearce, David H. and Hallerberg, Mark. 2011. "Democracy and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes" *Economics and Politics*. 23(2):172-194.
- Eichengreen, Barry and David Leblang. 2008. "Democracy and Globalization." *Economics and Globalization*. 20(3):289-334.
- Clark and Hallerberg, "Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy". *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 323-346
- Leblang, D., & Satyanath, S. (2006). Institutions, expectations, and currency crises. *International Organization*, 60(1), 245.
- William Bernhard and David Leblang, "Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments." *International Organization* 53, 1 (1999):71-97.
- David Andrew Singer. 2004. "Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization," *International Organization* 58:3 (August), pp. 531-565.
- Cohen, Benjamin J. *Currency Power*. Chapter TBD.
- Mosley, Layna. 2000. "Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States." *International Organization*. 54:4. 737-773.
- Scott J. Basinger and Mark Hallerberg, "Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom," *American Political Science Review* 98:2 (May 2004), 261-276.
- Andrew, David M. 1994. Capital Mobility and State Autonomy. *International Studies Quarterly* 38(3): 193-218.
- Mosely, Layna. *Global Capital and National Governments*.

7. Money: Debt and Crises

Required:

- Tomz, Michael. 2007. Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chapters 1-2.
- Stasavage, David. 2007. "Cities, Constitutions, and Sovereign Borrowing in Europe, 1274–1785." *International Organization* 61(3): 489–525.
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9. Ties between flows & ties to security

Required:

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Interdependence

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- Yi Che, Yi Lu, Justin R. Pierce, Peter K. Schott, and Zhigang Tao. 2016. "Does Trade Liberalization with China Influence U.S. Elections?" NBER Working Paper 22178.
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- Everything else Randall Stone has written...

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