

**INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY**  
**Political Science 231**  
**Spring 2018, Th 12-2:50, Bunche 4276**

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Office Hours: Tuesdays 1-3pm and by appointment

**Course Description:**

This course examines how domestic and international politics influence the economic relations between states. It will address the major theoretical debates in the field and introduce the chief methodological approaches used in contemporary analyses. We will focus attention on four types of cross-border flows and the policies and international institutions that regulate them: the flow of goods (trade policy), the flow of capital (financial and exchange rate policy), the flow and location of production (foreign direct investment policy), and the flow of people (immigration policy).

The course is organized somewhat differently from how it is taught elsewhere. Each week is organized by its theoretical or empirical approach rather than area of substance. The goal of this organization is to help you think across the silos of IPE.

**Requirements:**

- All students are required to attend class regularly and to participate in classroom lectures and discussions.
- Students are also required to choose three weeks to write short critical reviews. The reviews, limited to five pages, summarize the theoretical and/or empirical results of two or three articles on a specific topic (articles should be from either the required or recommended reading list on the syllabus for a given topic), highlight the contribution, critically evaluate the work (e.g. highlight strengths and weaknesses of the theory or research design), and suggest research that would extend, further evaluate, and/or correct the summarized work. The reviews are to be sent by email to me by **5pm** the day preceding the class meeting on which the topic will be discussed. At the discretion of the instructor, the student may be asked to discuss some of his/her arguments in class.
- In addition to regular participation and the topic reviews, each student must select one of two options for fulfilling the remaining course requirements:
  - *Option 1 (highly recommended)*: Take home final exam. The take home final will be in the format of a field exam, but shorter and only focused on IPE.
  - *Option 2*: Students selecting this option should write one 20-35 page paper that presents original research. The paper should be completed by the end of the exam period in June. It is highly recommended that students meet with the instructor to discuss their topic by mid-April and submit a two to three-page outline by early May. One particularly effective strategy for this paper is a replication and extension of previously published research.

This option is much more time consuming and difficult than Option 1 and is offered only for students who want or need to write research paper to fulfill requirements in their program (mostly PhD political science students who need a field paper). Unless you need to fulfill such a requirement, the exam is highly recommended.

The requirements for the course will have the following weights;

Participation: 30%

Critical Reviews: 20%

Final Exam/ Paper: 50%

### **Readings and Schedule:**

*Note about the readings:* You will find some readings listed as required and others as recommended. The recommended readings are there to expand on a topic for those who might want to do research/ are where I dump old readings that I've updated with something new. That said, I expect that most students will read at least one additional reading a week.

*Suggested Background Materials (For those with limited familiarity with IPE)*

- Krugman, Paul and Maurice Obsfelt (and Melitz). *International Economics*. Chapters noted will be from the 10<sup>th</sup> edition, you can use any edition but some of the earlier editions do not have the chapter on “new” new trade.
- Bansak, Cynthia, Nicole B. Simpson, and Madeline Zavodny. *The Economics of Immigration*

#### 1. History of the Global Economy

In discussion for this week, I want you to come with questions and observations from the Frieden book (which you should buy). What is new to you? (Maybe everything.) What confused you? What did you find most interesting? The goal is to introduce you all to the history of globalization over the last two centuries; some of the major policy debates and issues; and give you some “data” with which to judge the later works.

Additionally, this will be one of the few weeks in which I am going to do a bit of lecturing. I will briefly go through

- Gains from trade
- Stolper-Samuelson
- Ricardo-Viner

Required:

- Read all of Jeffrey A. Frieden, *Global Capitalism*

Recommended:

- Economics texts:
  - Krugman, Obsfelt, & Melitz: Ch. 2-5, 9

- Bansak et al.: Ch. 7 & 8
  - Kind of nerdy debates on the history of IPE, different approaches, etc.
    - Cohen, B. J. (2008). *International political economy: an intellectual history*. Princeton, New Jersey. **Chapters 2 & 3**
    - Lake, David. 2009. "Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review." *The Review of International Organizations* 4(3):219-44.
    - Oatley, T. (2011). The reductionist gamble: Open economy politics in the global economy. *International Organization* 65(2), 311–341.
    - Keohane, R. O. (2009). The old IPE and the new. *Review of International Political Economy*, 16(1), 34-46.
    - Seabrooke, L., & Young, K. L. (2017). The networks and niches of international political economy. *Review of International Political Economy*, 24(2), 288-331.
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## 2. Individual Preferences/ Public Opinion

### Required:

- Scheve, Kenneth, & Matthew Slaughter. 2001. "What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54(2): 267–292.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Diana C. Mutz. 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety." *International Organization* 63 (3):425-57.
- Rho, S. and Tomz, M., 2017. Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?. *International Organization*, 71(S1), pp.85-108.
- Alexandra Guisinger. 2017. *American Opinion on Trade*. Oxford University Press. Chapter 6.
- Walter, S., 2010. Globalization and the welfare state: Testing the microfoundations of the compensation hypothesis. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(2), pp.403-426.
- Goldstein, Judith L., and Margaret E. Peters. 2014. "Nativism or Economic Threat: Attitudes Toward Immigrants During the Great Recession." *International Interactions*.

### Recommended:

- Erica Owen, Noel P. Johnston. 2017. "Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment." *International Organization*
- Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi. 2014. "Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Trade Policy, ILWU Puzzle." *International Organization*
- Lu, Xiaobo, Kenneth Scheve, and Matthew J. Slaughter (2012) "Inequity Aversion and the International Distribution of Trade Protection" *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3)July, 638-654.
- Hainmueller, Jens, & Michael Hiscox. 2006. "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade." *International Organization* 60(2): 469–498.

- Hanson, Gordon, Kenneth F. Scheve, & Matthew J. Slaughter. 2007. "Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies." *Economics and Politics* 19(1): 1–33.
  - Hays, Jude S., Sean D. Ehrlich, & Clint Peinhardt. 2005. "Government Spending and Public Support for Trade in the OECD: An Empirical Test of the Embedded Liberalism Thesis." *International Organization* 59(2): 473–494.
  - Broz, J. Lawrence, Jeffrey Frieden, & Stephen Weymouth. 2008. "Exchange Rate Policy Attitudes: Direct Evidence from Survey Data." *IMF Staff Papers* 55(3): 417–444.
  - Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael Hiscox. 2010. "Attitudes toward Highly-Skilled and Low-Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 104 (1):61-84.
  - Baker, Andy. 2005. "Who Wants to Globalize? Consumer Tastes and Labor Markets in a Theory of Trade Policy Beliefs." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(4): 924–938. 2
  - Mayda, Anna, & Dani Rodrik. 2005. "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?" *European Economic Review* 49(6): 1393–1430.
  - Dutt, Pushan, & Devashish Mitra. 2005. "Political Ideology and Endogenous Trade Policy: An Empirical Investigation." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(1): 59–72.
  - O'Rourke, Kevin H., & Richard Sinnott. 2001. "The Determinants of Individual Trade-Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence." *Brookings Trade Forum* 2001: 157–196.
  - Scheve, Kenneth, & Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. *Globalization and the Perceptions of American Workers*. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics.
  - Tavares, José. 2008. "Trade, Factor Proportions, and Political Rights." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 90(1): 163–168.
  - Verdier, Daniel. 1994 *Democracy and International Trade: Britain, France, and the United States, 1860–1990*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  - Malhotra, Neil, Yotam Margalit, and Cecilia Mo. 2013. "Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact." *American Journal of Political Science*.
  - Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J. Hiscox. 2007. "Educated Preferences: Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe." *International Organization* 61: 399–442
  - Mayda, Anna Maria. 2008. "Why are people more pro-trade than pro-migration?" *Economic Letters* 101: 160–163.
  - Peters, Margaret E., and Alexander M. Tahk. 2011. "Are policy makers out of touch with their constituencies when it comes to immigration?"
  - Jupille, Joseph and David Leblang. 2007. "Voting for Change: Calculation, Community and Euro Referendums," *International Organization* 61:763-82.
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### 3. Interest Groups

#### Required:

- Rogowski, Ronald. 1992. *Commerce and Coalitions*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. Chapters 1 and 2
- Alt, James E., & Michael Gilligan. 1994. "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2(2): 165–192.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. "Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation." *American Political Science Review* 96(3): 593–608.
- Grossman, Gene M., & Elhanan Helpman. 1994. "Protection for Sale." *American Economic Review* 84(4): 833–850.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. *Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy*. Ch. 1 & 3.
- Walter, S., 2008. A new approach for determining exchange-rate level preferences. *International Organization*, 62(3), pp.405-438.

#### Recommended econ texts:

- J. Lawrence Broz and Jeffrey Frieden, "The Political Economy of International Monetary Relations," *Annual Review of Political Science* 4 (2001):317-343.
- Christopher J. Neely, "An Introduction to Capital Controls," *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review* 81:6 (Nov/Dec 1999):13-30.
- Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz: Ch. 15-21

#### Recommended:

- Dean, Adam. "The gilded wage: profit-sharing institutions and the political economy of trade." *International Studies Quarterly* 59, no. 2 (2015): 316-329.
- Megumi Naoi and Ellis Krauss. 2009. "Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interest Politics under Alternative Electoral System" *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol.53, No.4. October 2009.
- Baldwin, Robert E., & Christopher Magee. 2000. "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills." *Public Choice* 105(1–2): 79–101.
- Gawande, Kishore, & Bandyopadhyay Usree. 2000. "Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman- Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 82(1): 139–152.
- Mitra, Devashish. 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination." *American Economic Review* 89(5): 1116–1134. 3
- Trefler, Daniel. 1993. "Trade Liberalization and the Theory of Endogenous Protection: An Econometric Study of U.S. Import Policy." *Journal of Political Economy* 101(1): 138–160.
- Bailey, Michael. 2001. "Quiet Influence: The Representation of Diffuse Interests on Trade Policy, 1983–94." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 26(1): 45–80.
- Ladewig, Jeffrey W. 2006. "Domestic Influences on International Trade Policy: Factor Mobility in the United States, 1963 to 1992." *International Organization*

- 60(1): 69–103.
- Hiscox. 2001. "Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade." *International Organization*, 55(1): 1-46.
  - Schnietz. 2003. "The Reaction of Private Interests to the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act." *International Organization*, 57(Winter): 213-33.
  - Douglas Nelson, "Endogenous Tariff Theory: A Critical Survey," *American Journal of Political Science*, August 1988.
  - Goldin, Claudia. 1994. "The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction: The United States, 1890-1921," in C. Goldin and G. Libecap (eds.) *The Regulated Economy: An Historical Analysis of Government and the Economy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  - Yotam Margalit. 2011. "Costly Jobs: Trade-related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in U.S. Elections." *American Political Science Review* 105, 166-188.
  - Goldberg, Pinelopi K., & Giovanni Maggi. 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 89(5): 1135–1155.
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#### 4. Firm-Based Models

##### Required:

- Melitz, Marc J., and Daniel Trefler. "Gains from trade when firms matter." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26, no. 2 (2012): 91-118.
- Milner, H. V. (1988). Trading places: Industries for free trade. *World Politics* 40(3), 350– 376.
- Peters, Margaret E. *Trading Barriers: Immigration and the Remaking of Globalization*. Chapters 2 & an empirical chapter to be chosen by the class
- Kim, I.S., 2017. Political cleavages within industry: firm-level lobbying for trade liberalization. *American Political Science Review*, 111(1), pp.1-20.
- Osgood, Iain, and Margaret Peters. "Escape Through Export? Women-Owned Enterprises, Domestic Discrimination, and Global Markets." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 12, no. 2 (2017): 143-183.

##### Recommended econ texts:

- Krugman, Obstfeld & Melitz: Ch. 7 &8

##### Recommended:

- Hathaway, Oona A., "Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection." *International Organization*
- Iain Osgood, "The Breakdown of Industrial Opposition to Trade: Firms, Product Variety and Reciprocal Liberalization," *World Politics* 69, No. 1 (2017), pages 184–231.
- Helpman, Elhanan. 2006. "Trade, FDI, and the Organization of Firms." *Journal of Economic Literature* 44(3): 589–630.
- Peters, Margaret E. 2014 "Trade, Foreign Direct Investment and Immigration



- Policy Making in the US.” *International Organization*.
- Peters, Margaret E. 2015. “Open Trade, Closed Borders: Immigration in the Era of Globalization.” *World Politics*.
  - Osgood, Iain. 2013. “Differentiated Products, Divided Industries: A Theory of Firm Preferences over Trade Liberalization” *Working Paper*. Harvard University
  - Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales. 2003. "The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century." *Journal of Financial Economics* 69 (1):5-50.
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## 5. Institutions 1: Domestic Institutions

### Required:

- Bailey, Michael, Judith Goldstein, & Barry R. Weingast. 1997. “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade.” *World Politics* 49(3): 309–338.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, & B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. “Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 305–321.
- Steinberg, David and Krishan Malhotra. 2014. “The Effect of Authoritarian Regime Type on Exchange Rate Policy.” *World Politics* (2014).
- Keefer, Philip, & David Stasavage. 2003. “The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy.” *American Political Science Review* 97(3): 407–423.
- Pandya, Sonal. *Trading Spaces: Foreign Direct Investments Regulation 1970-2000*. Ch. 2 & 5.

### Recommended:

- Menendez, Irene. "Globalization and welfare spending: how geography and electoral institutions condition compensation." *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 4 (2016): 665-676.
- Li, Quan, & Adam Resnick. 2003. “Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 57(1): 175–211.
- Jensen, Nathan. 2003. “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment.” *International Organization* 57(3): 587–616.
- Timmer, A. S. and J. G. Williamson (1998). Immigration policy prior to the 1930s: Labor markets, policy interactions, and globalization backlash. *Population and Development Review* 24(4), 739–771.
- Milner, Helen and Keiko Kubota. 2005. “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade in Developing Countries.” *International Organization* 59(1):107-143.
- Daniel Y. Kono, “Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency.” *American Political Science Review* 100, 3 (August 2006):369-384.

- Bearce, David H. and Hallerberg, Mark. 2011. "Democracy and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes" *Economics and Politics*. 23(2):172-194.
  - Eichengreen, Barry and David Leblang. 2008. "Democracy and Globalization." *Economics and Globalization*. 20(3):289-334.
  - Pinto, Pablo, and Santiago M. Pinto. 2008. "The Politics of Investment. Partisanship and the Sectoral Allocation of Foreign Direct Investment." *Economics & Politics* 20(2):216–254.
  - Henisz, Witold J. 2000. "The Institutional Environment for Multinational Investment." *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 16(2): 334–364.
  - J. Lawrence Broz, "Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes." *International Organization* 56, 4 (Autumn 2002):863-889.
  - Money, Jeanette. 1997. No Vacancy. The Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced, Market Economy Countries." *International Organization* 51:4 (Fall 1997).
  - Leblang, D., & Satyanath, S. (2006). Institutions, expectations, and currency crises. *International Organization*, 60(1), 245.
  - William Bernhard and David Leblang, "Democratic Institutions and Exchange Rate Commitments." *International Organization* 53, 1 (1999):71-97.
  - Clark and Hallerberg, "Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy". *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, No. 2 (Jun., 2000), pp. 323-346
  - Hiscox, Michael J. 1999. "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform, and Trade Liberalization." *International Organization* 53(4): 669–698.
  - Irwin, Douglas A., & Randall S. Kroszner. 1999. "Interests, Institutions, and Ideology in Securing Policy Change: The Republican Conversion to Trade Liberalization after Smoot-Hawley." *Journal of Law and Economics* 42(2): 643–673.
  - Alt, James E., Jeffrey Frieden, Michael Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, & Ronald Rogowski. 1996. "The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry." *Comparative Political Studies* 29(6): 689–717.
  - Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions." *International Organization* 41(2): 203–223.
  - Mansfield, Edward D., & Marc L. Busch. 1995. "The Political Economy of Nontariff Barriers: A Cross-National Analysis." *International Organization* 49(4): 723–749.
  - Park, Jong Hee, and Nathan Jensen. 2007. "Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries." *American Journal of Political Science* 51(2):314-329.
  - Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J., & Thaicharoen, Y. (2003). Institutional causes, macroeconomic symptoms: volatility, crises and growth. *Journal of monetary economics*, 50(1), 49-123.
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## 6. Institutions 2: International Organizations, Treaties, Etc.

### Required:

- Rosendorff, B.P. and Milner, H.V., 2001. The optimal design of international trade institutions: Uncertainty and escape. *International Organization*, 55(4), pp.829-857.
- Davis, Christina. 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization." *American Political Science Review*. 98:1. 153-69.
- Goldstein, J.L., Rivers, D. and Tomz, M., 2007. Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the WTO on World Trade. *International Organization*, 61(1), pp.37-67.
- Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, & Beth A. Simmons. 2006. "Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000." *International Organization* 60(4): 811–846.
- Colgan, Jeff. 2014. "The Emperor Has No Clothes: The Limits of OPEC in the Global Oil Market." *International Organization*.
- Julia Gray, "Life, Death or Zombies" forthcoming in ISQ.

### Recommended:

- Bagwell, Kyle, & Robert W. Staiger. 1999. "An Economic Theory of GATT." *American Economic Review* 89(1): 215–248.
- David Andrew Singer. 2004. "Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization," *International Organization* 58:3 (August), pp. 531-565.
- Peters, Margaret E. 2018. "Immigration, Delegation and International Law." *Working Paper*. UCLA.
- Maggi, Giovanni, & Andres Rodriguez-Clare. 1998. "The Value of Trade Agreements in the Presence of Political Pressures." *Journal of Political Economy* 106(3): 574–601.
- Rosendorff, Peter. 2005. "Stability and Rigidity: Politics and the Design of the WTO's Dispute Resolution Procedure." *American Political Science Review* 99(3):389-400.
- Koremenos, Barbara. 2007. "If Only Half of International Agreements Have Dispute Resolutions Provisions, Which Half Needs Explaining?" *Journal of Legal Studies*. 16. 189-212
- Jeffrey Kucik and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime." *International Organization* 62 (Summer): 477–505.
- Maggi, Giovanni. 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation." *American Economic Review* 89(1): 190–214.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, & B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 56(3): 477– 513.
- Maggi, Giovanni, & Andres Rodriguez-Clare. 2007. "A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements." *American Economic Review* 97(4): 1374-1406.

- Staiger, Robert W. 1995. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy." In Grossman, Gene M., & Kenneth Rogoff. eds. *Handbook of International Economics*. Vol. 3. New York, NY: Elsevier, pp. 1495–1551.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter, & Helen V. Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." *International Organization* 55(4): 829–857.
- Grossman, Gene M., & Elhanan Helpman. 1995. "Trade Wars and Trade Talks." *Journal of Political Economy* 103(4): 675–708.
- Jandhyala, Srividya, Witold J. Henisz, and Edward D. Mansfield. 2011. "Three Waves of BITs: The Global Diffusion of Foreign Investment Policy." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 55(6):1047-1073.
- Rose, Andrew K. 2004. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?" *American Economic Review* 94(1): 98–114.
- Tomz, Michael, Judith L. Goldstein, & Douglas Rivers. 2007. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment." *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2005–2018.
- Rose, Andrew K. 2007. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Reply." *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2019–2025.
- Marc L. Busch. 2007. "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade." *International Organization* 61 (Fall): 735–61.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan and Tobin, Jennifer. 2009. "Do BITs Benefit Developing Countries?" In *The Future of Investment Arbitration*, R.P. Alford & C. A. Rogers eds.
- Kerner, Andrew and Jane Lawrence. 2012. *What's The Risk? Bilateral Investment Treaties, Political Risk and Fixed Capital Accumulation* British Journal of Political Science.
- Allee, Todd, & Clint Peinhardt. 2011. "Contingent Credibility: The Impact of Investment Treaty Violations on Foreign Direct Investment." *International Organization* 65(3): 401–432.
- Gray, Julia. *Governance Against the Odds: States, Bureaucracies, and Vitality in International Economic Organizations* Chapter 5.
- Staiger, Robert W., & Guido Tabellini. 1999. "Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?" *Economics and Politics* 11(2): 109–44.
- Bagwell, Kyle, & Robert Staiger. 2002. *The Economics of the World Trading System*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Gowa, Joanne, & Soo Yeon Kim. 2005. "An Exclusive Country Club: The Effects of the GATT on Trade, 1950–94." *World Politics* 57(4): 453–478.
- Limão, Nuno 2006. "Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States." *American Economic Review* 96(3): 896–914.
- Limão, Nuno 2007. "Are Preferential Trade Agreements with Non-Trade Objectives a Stumbling Block for Multilateral Liberalization?" *Review of Economic Studies* 74(3): 821–855.
- Estevadeordal, Antoni, Caroline Freund, & Emanuel Ornelas. 2008. "Does Regionalism Affect Trade Liberalization Toward Nonmembers?" *Quarterly*

- Journal of Economics 123(4): 1531–1575.
- Jackson, John. 2000. “The Role and Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism.” *Brookings Trade Forum* 2000: 179–219.
  - Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” *International Security* 19(3): 5–49.
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## 7. Power/ International Constraints

### Required:

- Kindleberger, Charles P. 1986. *The World in Depression 1929–1939*. Revised and enlarged edition. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, Chapter 14.
- Eichengreen, Barry. 1992. *Golden Fetters*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 1.
- Cohen, Benjamin J. *Currency Power*. Chapter TBD.
- Krasner, Stephen. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” *World Politics* 28(3): 317–347.
- Gowa, Joanne, & Edward Mansfield. 1993. “Power Politics and International Trade.” *American Political Science Review* 87(2): 408–420.
- Mosley, Layna. 2000. “Room to Move: International Financial Markets and National Welfare States.” *International Organization*. 54:4. 737-773.
- Wellhausen, Rachel. 2015. *The Shield of Nationality: When Governments Break Contracts with Foreign Firms*. Ch. 2 & 5

### Recommended:

- John Goodman and Louis Pauly (1993) The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets *World Politics* 46(1):50-82.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, Jay C. Shambaugh, & Alan M. Taylor. 2005. “The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility.” *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(3): 423–438.
- Hirschman, Albert. *National Power and the Structure of Trade*. Chapters 1-3.
- Davis, Christina, and Sophie Meunier. Forthcoming. “Business as Usual? Economic Responses to Political Tensions.” *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Scott J. Basinger and Mark Hallerberg, “Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom,” *American Political Science Review* 98:2 (May 2004), 261-276.
- Beth Simmons, *Who Adjusts: Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policy During the Interwar Years* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994): 174-218.
- Duncan Snidal, "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," *International Organization* 39 (Autumn 1985), 579-614.
- Kindleberger, Charles P. 1975. “The Rise of Free Trade in Western Europe, 1820–1875.” *Journal of Economic History* 35(1): 20–55.
- Gowa, Joanne. 1989. “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?” *World Politics* 41(3): 307–324.

- Gowa, Joanne. 1989. "Bipolarity, Multipolarity and Free Trade." *American Political Science Review* 83(4): 1245–1256.
  - Lake, David. 1988. *Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887–1939*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
  - Mansfield, Edward. 1994. *Power, Trade, and War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  - J. Goldstein and J. Gowa, "Building the GATT/WTO Regime: The Hegemon's Dilemma" *World Trade Review*, 2004.
  - Lloyd Gruber, *Ruling the World*, pp. 15-57.
  - Keohane, Robert. 1997. "Problematic Lucidity" *World Politics*. October.
  - Krasner. 1991. "Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier." *World Politics*, 43(3): 336-66.
  - Mosely, Layna. *Global Capital and National Governments*.
  - Berger, Daniel, William Easterly, Nathan Nunn, & Shanker Satyanath. Forthcoming. "Commercial Imperialism? Political Influence and Trade During the Cold War." *American Economic Review*.
  - Andrew, David M. 1994. Capital Mobility and State Autonomy. *International Studies Quarterly* 38(3): 193-218.
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## 8. Ideas

### Required:

- Goldstein, Judith and Robert O. Keohane. 1993. "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework." In *Ideas and Foreign Policy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Ikenberry, G. John. 1993. "Creating Yesterday's New World Order: Keynesian 'New Thinking' and the Anglo-American Postwar Settlement." In *Ideas and Foreign Policy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Morrison, James. "Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization." *International Organization* 66(3): 395-428
- Chwieroth, Jeffrey. 2007. "Neoliberal Economists and Capital Account Liberalization in Emerging Markets." *International Organization*. 61(2): 443-463.
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### Recommend:

- Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl. *From the Corn Laws to Free Trade: Ideas, Interests, and Institutions in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006.
- Peter Haas, "Banning CFCS: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone Coordination," *International Organization* 46(1):187-36.
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- Keith A. Darden, *Economic Liberalism and Its Rivals: The Formation of International Institutions Among the Post-Soviet States*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Chapter 1.
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  - Finnemore and Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, *IO*, 1998, 52:4.
  - Goldstein, Judith. "Ideas, institutions, and American trade policy." *International Organization* 42, no. 1 (1988): 179-217.
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## 9. Overlap between areas of IPE & Security

### Required:

- Tobin, Jennifer L. & Marc L. Busch. 2010. "A BIT is Better Than a Lot: Bilateral Investment Treaties and Preferential Trade Agreements." *World Politics* 62(1): 1–42.
- Broz, J. Lawrence, & Seth H. Werfel. Forthcoming. "Exchange Rates and Industry Demands for Trade Protection." *International Organization*.
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- Singer, D. A. (2010). Migrant remittances and exchange rate regimes in the developing world. *American Political Science Review* 104 (2), 307–323.
- Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett, and David Leblang. "Migration and foreign aid." *International Organization* 69, no. 3 (2015): 627-657.
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- Owen, Erica. "Exposure to Offshoring and the Politics of Trade Liberalization: Debate and Votes on Free Trade Agreements in the US House of Representatives, 2001–2006." *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2017): 297-311.
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- Buthe, Tim, and Helen Milner. 2008. "The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4):741–62.

- Avner Grief “Greif. 1993. “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders’ Coalition.” *The American Economic Review*, 83(3): 525-548.
- John Oneal and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: Assessing the Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992.” *World Politics* 52, 1 (October 1999).
- Stephen Brooks, “The Globalization of Production and the Changing Benefits of Conquest.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, 5 (October 1999).
- Ben Fordham. “Revisionism Reconsidered: Exports and American Intervention in World War I.” *International Organization* 61, 2 (April 2007): 277-310.
- David M. Rowe, “World Economic Expansion and National Security in Pre-World War I Europe.” *International Organization* 53 (Spring 1999):195–231.
- Schultz, Kenneth A., & Barry R. Weingast. 2003. “The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Competition.” *International Organization* 57(1): 3–42.

10. All the stuff that I have to teach you or I get kicked out of IPES but haven’t yet because we only have 10 weeks

- Sovereign Debt, Credible Commitments, & Debt Crises:
  - Tomz, Michael. 2007. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, chapters 1-2.
  - Sarah Bauerle Danzman, W. Kindred Winecoff, and Thomas Oatley. 2017. “All Crises Are Global: Capital Cycles in an Imbalanced International Political Economy.” *International Studies Quarterly* 61(4): 907-23.
- Aid:
  - Bermeo, Sarah. *Targeted Development: Industrialized Country Strategy in a Globalized World*. Ch. 1 & 4
- Environment & Gender:
  - Green, J.F. and Hale, T.N., 2017. Reversing the marginalization of global environmental politics in international relations: An opportunity for the discipline. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 50(2), pp.473-479.
  - Griffin, Penny. (2007). Refashioning IPE: What and how gender analysis teaches international (global) political economy. *Review of International Political Economy*, 14(4), 720.
- Global Supply Chains and the Global System:
  - Meckling, Jonas, and Llewelyn Hughes. "Globalizing solar: Global supply chains and trade preferences." *International Studies Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2017): 225-235.
  - Stephen Chaudoin, Helen V. Milner, and Xun Pang. 2015. “International Systems and Domestic Politics: Linking Complex Interactions with Empirical Models in International Relations.” *International Organization* 69 (3): 1-35.



Recommended:

- Sovereign Debt
  - Brooks, Sarah M., Raphael Cunha, and Layna Mosley. "Categories, Creditworthiness, and Contagion: How Investors' Shortcuts Affect Sovereign Debt Markets." *International Studies Quarterly* 59, no. 3 (2015): 587-601.
  - North, Douglass, C., & Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England." *Journal of Economic History* 49(4): 803–832.
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  - Aggarwal, Vinod K. 1996. *Debt Games: Strategic Interaction in International Debt Rescheduling*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  - Stasavage, David. 2003. *Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Credible Commitments
  - Simmons, B. A. (2000). "International Law and State Behavior: Commitment and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs" *American Political Science Review* 94 (4): 819-35.
  - von Stein, J. (2005). Do treaties constrain or screen? selection bias and treaty compliance. *American Political Science Review* 99(4), 611–622.
  - Nunn, Nathan (2007). "Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade". *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 122(2):569-600.
  - Simmons, Beth A., & Zachary Elkins. 2004. "The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy Diffusion in the International Political Economy." *American Political Science Review* 98(1): 171–189.
- Aid
  - Dreher, Axel, Jan-Egbert Sturm, & James R. Vreeland. 2009. "Development Aid and International Politics: Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence World Bank Decisions?" *Journal of Development Economics* 88(1): 1–18.
  - Stone, Randall. 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality." *International Organization* 62(4): 589–620.
  - Stone, Randall. 2004. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa." *American Political Science Review* 98(4): 577–591.
- The Global System

- Weinberg, Joe. "European Union Member States in Cross-National Analyses: The Dangers of Neglecting Supranational Policymaking." *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 1 (2016): 98-106.
- Kalyanpur, Nikhil and Abraham Newman, 2018. "Mobilizing Market Power: Jurisdictional expansion as economic statecraft." Forthcoming *IO*.